Intermediated Investment Management
Investment advisers perform the role of assisting clients with their investments and distributing portfolio management services. While the vast majority of clients employ advisory services,an important issue is how well advisers perform in this capacity. Our theoretical model analyzes the impacts on portfolio performance,fund flows,fund sizes and welfare from the use of advisers. An important aspect of our analysis is the extent to which conflicts of interest such as influence activity can bias the asset allocation decisions of advisers. Interestingly advisory services are utilized to a greater extent under this circumstance. We show that investment advisers help to improve social welfare,but much of the welfare gain is extracted by the portfolio manager. When influence activity is feasible,investors welfare is adversely affected by the presence of advisers.
Neal M.Stoughton YouchangWu Josef Zechner
University of Calgary University of Vienna
国际会议
成都
英文
2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）