双边道德风险与风险投资的资本结构

摘要：

Under the more general settings than before, this paper constructs a double moral hazard model between venture capitalist (VC) and entrepreneur, and we derives endogenously the capital structure of venture capital financing. We find that the compensation to the entrepreneur is a “bang-bang which gives him common stocks only when profit exceeding a particular level, while the payoff to the VC is convertible preferred stocks. This outcome depends on three key assumptions: (i) both of their efforts can increase stochastically the profit; (ii) efforts are complement; (iii) in view of the maximum likelihood, entrepreneur play key role in developing the enterprise.

关键词： Venture capital Double moral hazard Capital structure Convertible preferred stock Baysian equilibrium

作者: 郭文新 曾勇

作者单位: 电子科技大学管理学院,成都 610054

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007年中国国际金融年会

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:中文

在线出版日期: 2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）