Closed-end versus Open-end: Share Redeemability and Cross-fund Subsidization

摘要：

The option shareholders have to liquidate their firms assets as an ultimate recourse is a powerful corporate governance mechanism (Fama and Jensen, 1983 a,b). For mutual funds, this mechanism takes the form of share redeemability. The redeemability of open-end funds over closed-end funds gives fund managers the incentive to favor one over the other. Using a unique setting of share redeemability and dataset of actual fund trades for China, this paper examines the importance of redeemability as a corporate governance mechanism by investigating whether closed-end and open-end funds with a fund family are run differently.

作者: Peter MacKay Daniel WU Xiongwei

作者单位: Department of Finance Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Clear Water Bay,Kowloon,Hong Kong

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007年中国国际金融年会

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）