Is There Penalty For Crime? Corporate Scandal and Management Turnover in China
Corporate fraud scandals have plagued the emerging markets such as China. This paper studies the cost to Chinese firms and their management for committing fraud.We find that the enforcement actions on firms with violation of securities laws from the regulation authorities are not severe. The stock price reactions to revelation of scandals are negative and statistically significant. We particularly examine the management turnover associated with the scandals. We find that fraud firms have higher management turnover than the matching non-fraud firms. However, we track down where the Chairman and CEO land after the turnover, and find a large portion of those leaving the fraud firms move to management positions in other firms and many of them actually even get promotion. Only a very small portion of CEOs and Chairmen receive legal or administrative penalty. We further find that Chairman and CEO with certain political background are less likely to receive legal or administrative penalties. We argue that the low effectiveness of law and lack of reputation mechanism on managerial labor market is associated to the rampancy of corporate frauds in China.
Corporate fraud management turnover penalty law China
Peng Sun Yi Zhang
Guanghua School of Management Peking University Beijing 100871,China
国际会议
成都
英文
2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）