会议专题

Condition Analysis of the Ultimate Controlling Shareholder Expropriate Minority Shareholder

This paper take the divergence of the ultimate controlling shareholder ownership produced by controlling minority structure and controlling right as research object, to study when will the ultimate controlling shareholder expropriates from minority shareholder by expanding LLSV model. Our results indicate that investor protection, relative ownership, and relative ROI are important influential factors of whether the ultimate controlling shareholder expropriate or expropriate much from minority shareholder. Our results are consistent with the outcomes of corporate governance empirical researches.

Controlling Minority Structure Investor Protection Relative Ownership Relative ROI Expropriation

吕长江 肖成民

复旦大学管理学院 吉林大学商学院

国际会议

2007年中国国际金融年会

成都

英文

2007-07-09(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)