Condition Analysis of the Ultimate Controlling Shareholder Expropriate Minority Shareholder
This paper take the divergence of the ultimate controlling shareholder ownership produced by controlling minority structure and controlling right as research object, to study when will the ultimate controlling shareholder expropriates from minority shareholder by expanding LLSV model. Our results indicate that investor protection, relative ownership, and relative ROI are important influential factors of whether the ultimate controlling shareholder expropriate or expropriate much from minority shareholder. Our results are consistent with the outcomes of corporate governance empirical researches.
Controlling Minority Structure Investor Protection Relative Ownership Relative ROI Expropriation
吕长江 肖成民
复旦大学管理学院 吉林大学商学院
国际会议
成都
英文
2007-07-09(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)