Can Product Market Competition Substitute the Internal Governance Structures? ——From Chinese Listed Companies Overinvestment

摘要：

Prior studies show that, product market Competition can reduce the managers’ slack and internal governance structures can prevent managers from moral hazards, but few studies on interactional effect of product market competition and internal governance structure on the overinvestment. Based on 278 listed companies of China during 2001-2005, this paper studies the interactional effect of the product market competition and internal governance structure on the overinvestment. We find, the investment is very sensitive to the cash flow ,784 company-years underinvested and 606 company-years overinvested. Then we find that, the better the board governance, the fewer the company overinvests, but the whole internal governance structures can’t reduce the overinvestment efficiently. We also find that product market competition and internal governance structures affect the overinvestment complementally.

关键词： Product market competition corporate governance overinvestment non-efficient-investment

作者: 张功富

作者单位: 暨南大学管理学院 广东 广州 510632

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007年中国国际金融年会

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）