Private Benefits in Privatization: Evidence from IPOs of State Owned Firms in China

摘要：

It is a common notion that there exist a significant conflict of interest between state and the bureaucrats who control state owned firms because the bureaucrats have essentially all the control rights but negligible share-holdings in those firms. Yet, there is no direct evidence of whether and how bureaucrats actively pursue private benefits at the cost of the state owned firms. Using data from IPOs of state owned firms in China, we find evidence supporting the notion that the bureaucrats are trying to get promotion by underpricing IPOs and allocating IPO shares to parties important to their careers. We find I) executives chance of promotion is positively correlated with the level of underpricing, and ii) those executives who can benefit more from underpricing actually underprice more.

关键词： Privatizations Rent-seeking IPO Underpricing Investment Risks Corporate Governance

作者: Zhaohui Chen Jongmoo Jay Choi Cao Jiang

作者单位: Department of Finance,Fox School of Business and Management,Temple University,Philadelphia,PA 19122 School of Business Administration,Holy Family University,Philadelphia,PA 19114

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007年中国国际金融年会

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）