An Option Games Model for Strategic Investment under Incomplete Information

摘要：

This paper studies the firms optimal preemption timing and its perfect Bayesian investment equilibrium. The research shows that the optimal investment is between NPV threshold and the monopolys optimal strategy;the value of real options can be eroded by competition while the introduction of incomplete information weakens the erosion,which indicates waiting is valuable even in very drastic preemption competition;and the greater the risk is,the further in advance the firm invests but the option value of waiting decreases.

关键词： investment decision real options duopoly option games incomplete information

作者: YU Dong-ping

作者单位: Institute of National Defense Economy and Management,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The First International Conference on Management Innovation(ICMI 2007)(管理创新会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 548-553

在线出版日期: 2007-06-04（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）