A Transaction Cost Nash Equilibrium Model for Adoption of Innovative Information Technology
This paper investigates the problem of innovative information technology adoption in multi-division organizations. Although innovative IT programs can increase benefits at the organizational level,they may encounter the resistance at the divisional level. To explain this situation,the paper propose an incentive-compatible general equilibrium model,named Transaction Cost Nash Equilibrium (TCNE),for studying the intra-organizational economy. From TCNEs point of view,the paper reveals that due to the impact of IT program adoption,divisions in an organization may have to adjust their efforts and so as their expected utilities will change. Only when all divisions expected utilities do not decrease,the IT program adoption will be feasible. As the incentive mechanism affects divisions utility function as well,it is possible that the organization aligns their incentive plan to achieve the success of the IT program. A case of computing facility upgrade is discussed to show the possible TCNE outcomes under different conditions.
Innovative IT adoption transaction cost Nash equilibrium intraorganizational equilibrium incentive alignment
Zhangxi Lin Nirup M. Menon
Centre for Advanced Analytics and Business Intelligence Texas Tech University Lubbock,USA School of Management The University of Texas at Dallas Richardson,USA
国际会议
The First International Conference on Management Innovation(ICMI 2007)(管理创新会议)
上海
英文
815-821
2007-06-04（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）