Competitive pricing with network externalities

摘要：

Network externality is widely in existence of many service industries. This paper analyzes competitive pricing with network externalitiesa by a two-stage dynamic duopoly pricing model,and gives the solution by game theory. Comparing with that in perfect monopoly pricing model with network externalities,we show that: when the intensities of network externalities are sufficient high,(1) Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prices increase as time passes just as in dynamic monopoly pricing,thus Coase Conjecture can be overcome. (2) In contrast to dynamic monopoly pricing,the higher the intensity of network externality,the less profits enterprises can get in duopoly pricing. (3) While enterprises have different intensities of network externalities,the enterprise with higher intensity of network externality tends to increase the price obviously,and can get more profit at the same time.

关键词： network externality coase conjecture duopoly pricing

作者: Guo Qiang

作者单位: Tourism College,Hainan University,Haikou,Renmin Road 58,570228,China.

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The First International Conference on Management Innovation(ICMI 2007)(管理创新会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 822-827

在线出版日期: 2007-06-04（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）