Governance Mechanism of Intermediarys Reputation Based on Games Theoretical Framework

摘要：

The paper first presented some literatures of intermediary and its credit. Then it discussed some instances of affecting intermediarys credit based on games theoretical framework. Furthermore,the paper set up a reputation effect model to analyze governance of intermediarys credit. Finally it gives some implications for governing intermediarys credit and policy. The results show that keeping intermediarys credit is a complex game which has many different equlibria in different conditions with various qualifications. In order to improve intermediarys credit,intermediary should strengthen its self-control mechanism,public should build a communication platform and government give efficient supervision.

关键词： Credit Intermediary Reputation Governance

作者: Li yingbo Xu zenghui

作者单位: School of Public Policy & Management,Tsinghua university,Beijing 100084,China Tsinghua University Archives,Beijing 100084,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The First International Conference on Management Innovation(ICMI 2007)(管理创新会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 1175-1180

在线出版日期: 2007-06-04（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）