Study on principal-agent problem with competitive multiple retailers in production distribution system
The problem of how manufacturers incite their retailers with competition to offer high service level is studied. Manufacturers (principals) have asymmetric information about retailers (agents) service level,which is private information of the latter. Because of substitutability of products,multiple retailers have competition. We applied the principal-agent theory to our analysis and proposed two models under symmetric and asymmetric information respectively. The results reveal that retailers service level increase with the increase of the degree of competition,i. e.,competitive pressure is a driving force for improving retailers service level. Further,comparing of the two kinds of contracts,we know that principals profits decrease monotonously with the increase of the degree of competition under symmetric information but increase firstly then decrease under asymmetric information,i. e.,competition between retailers reduces manufacturers loss. In addition,the analysis on information value is carried out. The results indicate that information value increases with the increase of the influencing coefficient of service level on outputs,retailers degree of risk aversion and exogenous uncertainty,but decreases with the increase of the degree of competition. All these results reveal that competition between retailers can weaken the influence of asymmetric information on manufacturers profit and manufacturers will obtain benefits by making proper use of competition.
asymmetric information competition distribution system incentive contract multiple retailers
LIU Chang-xian SUN Jian-ping TIAN Hou-ping
School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Science & Technology,Nanjing 210094,China
国际会议
The First International Conference on Management Innovation(ICMI 2007)(管理创新会议)
上海
英文
1205-1209
2007-06-04（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）