The Influence of Rent-seeking on the Operational Risk of Bank Credit

摘要：

This paper studies the influence of the rent-seeking of banks’ mangers on the operational risk of bank credit. After demonstrating the existence of the operational risk in bank credit, the paper builds the loan-game model between the banks and the enterprises, the rent-seeking game model between the enterprises and the banks’ managers as well as the agent game model between the banks and the banks’ managers. These models explain the mechanism of how the managers’ rent-seeking behaviors influence the operational risk in bank credit.

作者: Hai-Qing Hu Dan Zhang Duo Huang

作者单位: Xian University of Technology, Xian 710054, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007年IEEE灰色系统与智能服务国际会议(2007 IEEE International Conference on Grey Systems and Intelligent Services)

会议地点: 南京

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2007-11-18（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）