Space-time Related Pairwise Key Predistribution Scheme for Wireless Seneor Networks
Most of existing pairwise key predistribution schemes (PKPS) for wireless sensor networks (WSN) have a common security vulnerability that an illegitimate node can use the keying material of a compromised node to set up pairwise keys with any non-compromised nodes in the network. Using this vulnerability, we propose the clone attack against WSN. To our knowledge, by far no PKPS can defend against this attack. We propose a polynomial based space-time related pairwise key predistribution scheme (PSPP), in which the keying material of a node can only works at its initial deployment location. Analysis shows that PSPP cannot only defend against the clone attack but also even baffle the execution of other attacks, e.g. Sybile attack cannot work in PSPP. Finally, we propose the extended PSPP (EPSPP), which has better collusion resistance.
WSN clone attack key predistribution
Fu Fei Liu Jing Yin Xianglan
Institute of Command Automation PLA University of Science & Technology Nanjing, China
国际会议
上海
英文
2007-09-21(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)