Real Option Exercise Games under Different Information and Market Structures

摘要：

This paper studies the firms optimal preemption timing and its perfect Bayesian investment equilibrium. The research shows that the optimal investment is between NPV threshold and the monopolys optimal strategy; the value of real options can be eroded by competition while the introduction of incomplete information weakens the erosion, which indicates waiting is valuable even in very drastic preemption competition.

关键词： duopoly investment decision incomplete information option games real options

作者: YU Dong-ping

作者单位: Institute of National Defense Economy and Management Central University of Finance and Economics Beijing, P. R. China, 100081

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第三届IEEE无线通讯、网络技术暨移动计算国际会议

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2007-09-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）