Analyzing the Dual-Channel Mechanism for Online Selling

摘要：

Many firms can sell identical products online using auctions and posted prices simultaneously. This paper develops a model of the key trade-offs sellers face in such a dual-channel setting, built about the optimal choice of the auction quantity, the auction duration, and the posted price. Our discussion is under the finite inventory of the seller. We model consumer choice of channels through a threshold type function based on the consumers power exponential utility function, prove a unique auction-participation symmetric equilibrium exists, and demonstrate its properties. The model enables the seller to segment the market appropriately so that the two channels reinforce each other and cannibalization is mitigated.

关键词： e-commerce online auctions dual- channel

作者: XU Li-ping LI Jin-lin RAN Lun

作者单位: School of Management and Economics Beijing Institute of Technology, BIT Beijing, P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第三届IEEE无线通讯、网络技术暨移动计算国际会议

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2007-09-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）