Supply Chain Coordination with Stock-Dependent Demand under Incremental Quantity Discount Policy
This paper considers coordination issues in a two level (manufacturer -retailer) channel, and the manufacturer in this system offers a single product to the retailer who faces a current stock dependent demand. Our work focuses on two aspects. We will first discuss, in the manufacturer-Stackelberg game structure, how the manufacturer sets the wholesale price of the product and how the retailer in turn determines the corresponding order quantity. Based on the assumption that the information is symmetrical, the paper then presents an incremental quantity discount mechanism that would make the manufacturer to get the most profit and ultimately achieve the channels perfect coordination. Last, a numerical example and sensitivity analyses of the major parameter are presented to illustrate the model.
supply chain coordination stock-dependent demand incremental quantity discount
Jie Min Yong-Wu Zhou Cheng-Bing Zhao
School of Management Hefei University of Technology Hefei, China Department of Mathematics and Physics Anhui Institute of Architecture and Industry Hefei, China
国际会议
上海
英文
2007-09-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）