Performance Comparisons of Closed-loop Supply Chains with Different Game Patterns

摘要：

In the light of closed-loop supply chains composed of a manufacturer and two retailers, where retailers indirectly collect used products, the impact of the decision rights leadership on the efficiency is examined using three models, based on game theory. When retailers break the decisionmaking authority equilibrium, and one retailer has order decision priority, the optimal profit of the retailers and manufacturer and the collect effort coefficient are all improved; the optimal profit of the whole supply chains, the consumer surplus and social welfares are also the biggest; therefore, the whole performance of supply chains is the best and thus social efficiency is the highest.

关键词： Decision Rights Leadership Closed-loopSupply Chains Remanufacturing Stackelberg game Cournot game Performance

作者: Da Qingli Li Xinjun Lin Hsinyi

作者单位: School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China Department of International Trade, Chungchou Institute of Technology, Zhanghua 51003,Taiwan

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第三届IEEE无线通讯、网络技术暨移动计算国际会议

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2007-09-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）