An Incentive Model of IS Outsourcing Contract
An approach to analyze incentive schemes and structuring IS outsourcing contracts for the mutual gain is presented in this paper. Outsourcing contract is critical to the management of the IS outsourcing relationship because improperly or incompletely written contracts can have significant negative implications for the firms. A linear principal-agent model based on EVA (Economic Value Added) for constructing incentive contracts in IS outsourcing is developed. Incentive management literature relative to linear principal-agent model has focused on determining the proportion of agents profit to principals profit to receive maximum economic returns from agents action. In fact, the validity of incentive is decided by the positive correlation between the variable of agents performance and outsourcing output. Arguing the feasibility of using EVA to evaluate the outsourcing vendors performance in IS outsourcing, a linear principal-agent model based on EVA is devised for improving IS outsourcing vendors performance and the advantage and disadvantage of this model was discussed.
Contract EVA Incentive IS Outsourcing
Jinmei Huai
School of Economics & Management East China Jiaotong University Nanchang, P.R.China
国际会议
上海
英文
2007-09-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）