A Venture Investment Principal-agent Model Base on Game Theory
This paper uses the approaches and models of game theory to analyze principal-agent problem between venture investment firm and venture enterprise. We analyzed the asymmetric information between venture investment firm and venture enterprise. We described the income and cost at this principal-agent problem under asymmetric information. Give mathematics expressions about every step action decision and their result-the cost, the profit of this principal-agent problem. We present a game model base on principal-agent theory under the asymmetric information; give the application and numerical result of our model. Then, discuss the optimum principal-agent cost, the profit and the action between venture investment firm and venture enterprise base on our model. Due to our model, a conclusion can be drawing that the effort degree under asymmetric information less than perfect information. Asymmetric information between venture enterprise and venture investment firm will lead to moral hazard. The lower effort level will lead to the agent cost which do not existed in perfect information circumstance. The intensity of venture investment firm selected due to the supervise cost and correlative profit.
game theory principal-agent Venture capital
Zhang Xu-bo Zhang Zi-gang
School of Management Huazhong University of Science and Technology Luoyu road 1037,Wuhan,Hubei province, China
国际会议
2007 IEEE International Conference on Automation and Lofistics
山东济南
英文
2007-08-18（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）