The Analysis of Signaling Game in Reverse Supply Chain

摘要：

This paper first constructs the signaling game model in reverse supply chain under incomplete information, then analyzes the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and deducts the conditions under which separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium and semi-separating equilibrium occurred. The best strategy for related manufacturers is also proposed. The conclusion in this paper may be helpful to enrich the theory of reverse supply chain, and offer guides to relevant practitioners.

关键词： Reverse supply chain Signaling game Perfect Bayesian equilibrium

作者: KAN Gong-jian WANG Yu-yan

作者单位: School of business management Department of logistics handong University of finance Jinan,Shandong P WANG Yu-yan College of Economics and Management Nanjing University of Aeronautics and AstronauticsNa

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 IEEE International Conference on Automation and Lofistics

会议地点: 山东济南

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2007-08-18（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）