A Game-theoretic Approach to Resource Sharing Management
This work deals with the situation when some firms (players) working on a market of the same product or services and which have to incur the similar expenses. They organize the network to save their money on these expenses using the resources of other firms. The problem is modelled as a cooperative game with transferable utility. This game is called the cooperative game of expenses allocation. The game where the firms enter the market one after another is examined. On the first two stages the strategies of the firms are the choices of the number of, the resource units that they share in this area. After two stages the firms cooperate in the network in this area and allocate their expenses using an imputation received in the cooperative game of expenses allocation.
cooperative games Shapley Value subgame perfect equilibrium.
Elena Parilina
Department of Mathematical Game Theory and Statistical Decisions Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Saint-Petersburg State University, Universitetskii prospekt, 35, Peterhof, Saint-Petersburg, 198504, Russia
国际会议
第二届中国对策论及其应用国际学术会议(The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications)
青岛
英文
49-52
2007-09-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）