The Punishment Mechanism Analysis of Cartel Alliance Mechanism
Cartel Alliance is made to seek the biggest profit of the whole alliance by limiting quantity firstly, then the total profit is allocated fairly. However the actions that several enterprises of the alliance try to seek their own (not the whole alliance) biggest profit (selecting Cournot competition model) will hurt the benefit of the other members and make the Cartel Alliance unsteady. The paper has introduced the punishment mechanism and used the principle of Nash equilibrium to get the condition that promises Cartel cooperation as Nash equilibrium point. The scope of punishment coefficient is solved.
game equilibrium cartel alliance cournot model punishment mechanism
Ming Jin Sheng Zhu
Statistical Department, Chengdu College of Information Technology, Sichuan, China, 610103
国际会议
第二届中国对策论及其应用国际学术会议(The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications)
青岛
英文
91-94
2007-09-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）