Differential Coalitional Game of Pollution Cost Reduction
In this paper a game theoretical model of pollution cost reduction is considered. This model was firstly introduced by Petrosjan and Zaccour (2001). There are n countries, which are players in this game. Payoffs of players are different. The coalitional partition is considered. It is assumed that the coalitions are acting as players. On the first step the Nash equilibrium of the game played by the coalitions is computed. On the second step the income of every coalition is allocated between its players according the Shapley Value.
coalitional game Nash equilibrium pollution reduction characteristic function PMS-vector Shapley value
Leon Petrosyan Nadezhda Kozlovskaya
St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Processes of Control 198504 St. Petersburg, University pr., 35, Russia
国际会议
第二届中国对策论及其应用国际学术会议(The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications)
青岛
英文
98-100
2007-09-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）