An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Quality Problem Between Enterprise and Supervise Organization
Under the condition of rationalism, we can apply the Replication Dynamic Equation in the Evolutionary Game to analyze the Game theory between the juice producer and the food safety organization, and make use of the Evolutionary Stable strategy to describe and discuss the stability, finally analyze the conclusion of this type of problems.
Game theory Replication Dynamic Equation Evolutionary Stable strategy
Xu-hua Lu Rui Gu
Wuhan University of Science and Technology, College of Science, 430081, China
国际会议
第二届中国对策论及其应用国际学术会议(The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications)
青岛
英文
135-138
2007-09-17(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)