Price Stackelberg Game Model Under Capacity Constraints
In this paper we investigate a price Stackelberg game model in a homogeneous product market. Two identical firms, which are limited by capacity constraints, compete with price as their strategic variable, and an efficient rationing rule is adopted. There is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in which the two firms quote the same prices. In certain capacity range, there is a second mover advantage. In addition, we analyze an asymmetric case and find the second mover advantage still exists.
Stackelberg equilibrium price capacity constrains
Ling-peng Meng Jian-min Wang Jin Xu
School of Mathematics and System Sciences, Shandong University, Shandong Province, China 250100
国际会议
第二届中国对策论及其应用国际学术会议(The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications)
青岛
英文
139-144
2007-09-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）