Communication Leading to Nash Equilibrium Through Robust Messages in S4-knowledge Model
A communication system in the S4-knowledge model is presented which leads to a Nash equilibrium of a strategic term game through robust messages. In the communication process each player the bf S4- knowledge model corresponding to the reflexive and transitive information structure, and he/she predicts the other players actions as the conditional probability of the actions under his/her private information structure. The players communicate privately their conjectures through message according to the communication graph, where each recipient of the message learns and revises his/her conjecture. The emphasis is on that each player sends not exact information about his/her individual conjecture but robust information about the conjectures to an accuracy a. We highlight a new aspect of communication among players in the theorems of Aumann and Brandenburger Epistemic conditions for mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, Econometrica 63 (1995) 1161-1180, and we remove out common-knowledge assumption in Theorem B of Aumann and Brandenburger.
Communication Robust message S4-knowledge model Nash equilibrium Protocol Conjecture Non-corporative game
Takashi Matsuhisa
Department of Natural Sciences, Ibaraki National College of Technology, Nakane 866, Hitachinaka-shi, Ibaraki 312-8508, Japan
国际会议
第二届中国对策论及其应用国际学术会议(The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications)
青岛
英文
180-182
2007-09-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）