Zero-sum Stochastic Dominance Continuous Game Model
The theory of classical continuous games supposes that players have common information about the payoff function. Because payment is often accompanied with uncertain information in practical problems, its difficult for players to use concrete mathematical forms to represent the payoff functions of games. Therefore, its necessary to explore continuous games of payment with incomplete information. This paper introduces the stochastic dominance theory into continuous games, establishes the continuous game model of stochastic dominance, puts forward such concept as players preference ordering, uses the symbol of payoff functions derivative of higher ordering to represent players preference and its degree, in which players in course of games only need to have knowledge of payoff functions category, not have to offer their concrete mathematical forms. Conceptions of t-optimal strategies and t×s game solutions of stochastic dominance are further defined. Consequences of discretional combination games of players with different preferences are studied, and necessary and sufficient conditions of t×s game solutions existence are in discussion.
continuous games preference type preference ordering t-degree stochastic dominance strategies t×s game solutions
Guo-qiang Xiong
School of Management, Xian University of Technology, Xian, P. R. China, 710054
国际会议
第二届中国对策论及其应用国际学术会议(The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications)
青岛
英文
223-228
2007-09-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）