Study on Persistence of Cooperation without Reciprocity
We consider a population initially consisting of cooperators and defectors, who areengaged in a Prisoners Dilemma. A cautious mutant is introduced who take some safeguard before cooperation. When meeting defectors, the mutant is assumed to avoid exploitation by using safeguard. According to replicator dynamics, there exists a fully mixed equilibrium consisting of naive cooperator, defector and cautious cooperator, a two-type equilibrium with cautious cooperators and defectors and the defectors- only corner solution. Depending on the parameters, these equilibria are evolutionary stable.
Evolutionary game Prisoners dilemma Cooperation persistence
Yu-yin Yi
School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou, 510632, China
国际会议
第二届中国对策论及其应用国际学术会议(The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications)
青岛
英文
238-243
2007-09-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）