Interval Shapley value for fuzzy Cooperative Games
In this paper, we make a study of the Shapley value with characteristic functions from the viewpoint that the payoff of each coalition are often only imprecisely or ambiguously known to the players as an interval number. Axioms of Shapley value which was given by Shapley in 1953 have been extended for the Interval Shapley value. The explicit and exclusive Interval Shapley value has been put forward, which has been applied to profit allocation scheme among partners. Because of the interval payoffs, the results of imputation in this paper are also interval numbers. Moreover, it is proven that any crisp Shapley value that corresponds to a real number belonging to interval range is remain with the bound of Interval Shapley. Because Interval fuzzy number is special fuzzy number, the results of our paper lay the foundation for the research on the solution of cooperative games with other fuzzy forms of payoffs.
(Interval) Cooperative Games Interval Shapley value Interval fuzzy number Imputation
Xiao-hui Yu Qiang Zhang
School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081
国际会议
第二届中国对策论及其应用国际学术会议(The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications)
青岛
英文
256-261
2007-09-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）