Strong Nash Equilibrium in a Repeated Environmental Eengineering Game with Stochastic Dynamics
Infinite repeated game is investigated, where stage game is Cournot oligopoly with three enterprises. Every enterprise has one source, ejecting poison to atmosphere. Pollution level in the production region has not to exceed a maximum permissible concentration (MPC). Else, every enterprise has to pay a fine. An Ecological Game is described to solve the environmental engineering problem. In the model market price of produced goods is a function of Itos stochastic process variable. For this stochastic game we consider a cooperative trajectory and investigate a stochastic imputation. In general, a stochastic imputation is time-inconsistent. We found a special time-consistent imputation distribution procedure which follows us to Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE).
Cournot oligopoly time-consistency strong Nash equilibrium
Nikolay Zenkevich Andrey Zyatchin
Graduate School of Management, Saint-Petersburg State University, Russia The Faculty of applied mathematics and control processes, Saint-Petersburg State University, Russia
国际会议
第二届中国对策论及其应用国际学术会议(The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications)
青岛
英文
262-266
2007-09-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）