Asset Prices Under Short-Sale Constraints
In this paper, we study how short-sale constraints a.ect asset price and market e±ciency. We consider a fully rational expectations equilibrium model, in which investors trade for two reasons, to share risk and to speculate on private information, but they face short-sale constraints. Short-sale constraints limit both types of trades, and thus reduce the allocational and informational e±ciency of the market. Limiting short sales driven by risk-sharing simply shifts the demand for the asset upwards and consequently its price. We show that in the presence of information asymmetry, limiting short sales driven by private information increases the uncertainty about the asset as perceived by uninformed investors, which reduces the demand for the asset. When this information e.ect dominates, short-sale constraints actually cause asset prices to decrease and price volatility to increase. Moreover, we show that short- sale constraints can give rise to discrete price drops accompanied by increases in volatility when the uncertainty perceived by uninformed investors surges in certain states.
Yang Bai Eric C. Chang Jiang Wang
Bai (yangbai@business.hku.hk) and Chang (ecchang@business.hku.hk) are from the School of Busi-ness, Wang (wangj@mit.edu) is from the Sloan School of Management, MIT,CCFR and NBER.
国际会议
西安
英文
2006-07-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）