Managerial Ownership Matters for Firm Performance:Evidence from China
We study the managerial ownership-performance relationship by examining a unique sample of non-listed Chinese firms, of which the ownership structure is essentially exogenously determined subject to government policies irrelevant to incentive contracting. In matching-sample comparisons, we find that firms of significant managerial ownership performed superiorly relative to those whose managers do not own equity shares. Our results indicate a strong and robust positive effect of managerial ownership on company performance. In contrast to existing studies, our results are not likely to suffer from an endogeneity problem that is often difficult to resolve with conventional data of publicly traded companies.
Managerial ownership Firm performance Agency costs
Yifan Hu Xianming Zhou
University of Hong Kong
国际会议
西安
英文
2006-07-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）