Bank Lending, Corporate Governance, and Government Ownership in China

摘要：

Examining the capital structures of 1252 firms publicly listed on China’s stock market, we show the effect of corporate borrowing on managerial agency costs. In contrast to the finance theories that debt financing helps to improve the quality of corporate governance, we find that an increase of bank loans increases the size of managerial perks and free cash flows, and that it decreases corporate value in the firms with the government as a large shareholder. When both the creditors and debtors are owned by the government, bank lending facilitates managerial exploitation of corporate wealth. The institutional arrangement of shared government ownership brings about the failure of corporate governance and the accumulations of bad loans in China.

关键词： bank lending corporate governance government ownership

作者: Lihui Tian

作者单位: Guanghua School of Management,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2005年中国国际金融年会

会议地点: 昆明

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2005-07-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）