Excess Control, Moral Hazard, and Corporate Performance:Evidence from Chinas Listed Companies

摘要：

The Purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence of the relationship between ownership structure of China’s listed companies and their performance.Using data for 479 companies listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange,we find the firm’s performance increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder,but decreases with the extent of ownership-control discrepancy. The evidence also indicates that the detrimental effect of the discrepancy is exacerbated when the firm is SOE owned or privately owned. Additional analysis reveals that the directors represent second largest shareholders tend to restrict the rent-extraction behavior of the controlling shareholder.

关键词： Ownership Control Excess Control Moral Hazard

作者: 施东晖 孙培源

作者单位: 上海证券交易所研究中心,200120 上海交通大学管理学院,200030

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2005年中国国际金融年会

会议地点: 昆明

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2005-07-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）