Firms Choice of Financing Means Under Private Benefits of Control──Theoretically Reflecting on Firms Financing by Issuing Convertible Bonds

摘要：

This paper extends the model of Stein (1992) in order to study how the firms of different profitableabilities under the existence of private benefit of control choose their financing tools, including issuing bonds,equities and convertible bonds. The existence of private benefits of control motivates the “good firms to issue convertible bonds financing, and the costless equilibrium in the Stein’s model is not the unique one.Firms’ issuing convertible bonds is the result of game equilibrium of the controlling shareholders of various firms and outside investors. The behavior of controlling shareholders pursuing the private benefit of control bring the market more uncertain factors, increase the agent cost of firms’ financing, and intensify the market volatility and speculative behavior. So it is necessary to control them.

关键词： Private benefits of control Convertible bonds The financial distress

作者: 夏晖 何佳

作者单位: 成都电子科技大学管理学院,610054 香港中文大学工商管理学院

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2005年中国国际金融年会

会议地点: 昆明

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2005-07-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）