Coordination of a Risk-Averse Supply Chain with Price Competition
Coordination issue is investigated in a risk-averse supply chain with competing agents. The supply chain consists of a distribution system in which a supplier provides a common product to N independent retailers. These retailers face their respective stochastic demand markets but compete with each other through sell price operation. The retail competition model and coordination model are established, and the interactive dynamics among retailers is characterized, especially the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium are demonstrated. Finally, channel coordination is addressed in the studied supply chain with new contracts. It is shown that these contracts can lead to the Pareto optimal solutions and achieve perfect coordination.
Yu TIAN Dao HUANG He LIU
East China University of Science and Technology, China
国际会议
2nd IEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and Applications(ICIEA 2007)(第二届IEEE工业电子与应用国际会议)
哈尔滨
英文
2007-05-23(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)