Reputation-aware Transaction Mechanisms in Grid Resource Market

摘要：

In the grid resource market, there is a severe information asymmetry problem between the resource providers and the resource consumers. It leads to dishonest trades and results in the great loss of the resource consumers. We propose two mechanisms named reputation-aware aggregate mechanism and reputation-aware double auction mechanism to solve this problem: a resource providers reputation value reflects the reliability of its resources; our mechanisms decide the trades between resource providers and consumers in terms of both reputation and price. The simulation results show that the reputation-aware aggregate mechanism and the reputation-aware double auction mechanism can both obviously decrease the loss of the resource consumers. The latter is more flexible and it reflects the traders wish better than the former at the expense of slightly reducing the honest deal times. They are efficient methods to solve the information asymmetry problem.

作者: Weina Lu Shoubao Yang Leitao Guo Rui Zhang

作者单位: Computer Science Department, University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026, P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第六届网格与协同计算国际会议(The Sixth International Conference on Grid and Cooperative Computing GCC 2007)

会议地点: 乌鲁木齐

会议语种:英文

页码: 154-159

在线出版日期: 2007-08-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）