A Mechanism with Penalty and Bonus in Grids
An important challenge in grids is load balancing,and it includes problems about incentives and selfinterest. Mechanism Design (MD) provides a goodsolution to these two problems. And a truthful mechanism can force participants to tell their truth if they want to maximize their interest. But a truthful mechanism cannot restrict participants behaviors in practice. In this paper, we extend mechanismsdefinitions, introduce the penalty and bonus, formulate the penalty and bonus model with power functions, and quantify the value with the delay instead of the execution value. Moreover, we apply the model to a specific load-balancing problem, and change the original mechanism with verification into a new mechanism with penalty and bonus. At last we make a simulation study about this new mechanism and prove the effectiveness of the model.
Duan-yang LIU De-cai HUANG
College of Information Engineering, Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, 310032, P.R.China
国际会议
第六届网格与协同计算国际会议(The Sixth International Conference on Grid and Cooperative Computing GCC 2007)
乌鲁木齐
英文
528-534
2007-08-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）