Research on Logistics Project Decision Making Under Asymmetric Duopoly Based on Option Games
Logistics project investment is featured as highly uncertainty. The project cost is always asymmetric when two firms make logistics project decision. The asymmetrical duopoly under uncertainty model is a more realistic hypothesis in logistics project investment. Here firms are non-homogenous because, for the same investment, one firm has lower investment cost than the other. This means that one firm has competitive advantage over the rival. In this paper we extend the option game model by considering issues like mixed strategies in asymmetric duopoly and the value of option to become a leader. We present the value function and the investment threshold of the leader, follower and the simultaneous under asymmetric duopoly.
Logistics Project Asymmetric Duopoly Option Games
Lu Juchun Zhao Liang
School of economics and management, Wuhan University, Wuhan P.R.China, 430072
国际会议
天津
英文
2007-10-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）