The Optimal Solution of a Price-only Contract
The price-only contract is the simplest type of contracts. A contract agreement results from gaming between a supplier and a demander referring to as a manufacturer and a retailer in the paper. The optimal solution of the price-only contract is obtained in terms of a two-stage programming based on the news-vendor model in the paper, which is impossible for previous studies because of methodology. The main results of the paper are: ? the optimal solution of the price-only contract is an equilibrium that is unique but may not be the globally best one as a Pareto equilibrium is; (2) the method proposed in the paper to find the optimal solution of the price-only contract can work for exploring gaming problems of other types of contracts such as buy-back contract and quantity-flexibility contract.
Supply-chain Management Price-only Contract Contract Gaming Two-stage Programming Method
Qu Yizhe Chen Jingxian Liu Wenpo
School of Management, Donghua University, Shanghai P.R.China, 200051
国际会议
天津
英文
2007-10-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）