A Stackelberg Game Model for Distribution System Under Stochastic Demand with Price-Elasticity and Service Level-Sensitivity
This paper studies a distribution system in which a manufacturer (leader) supplies a single product to a dealer (follower). Under stochastic demand with price-elasticity and service level-sensitivity, the total profit functions for the dealer and the manufacturer are given, respectively. Based on that, the optimal inventory decision policy and the price discount offered by the vendor are determined as a solution to a Stackelberg game model, which is solved by numerical method. Finally, conclusions and expectations on future research are presented.
Supply Chain Management Distribution System Coordination Price Discount Household Electrical Appliances
Gao Jun-jun Tan Chong-li Yu Lai-ruo
Sydney Institute of Language and Commerce, Shanghai University, Shanghai P.R.China, 201800
国际会议
天津
英文
2007-10-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）