Auctioning Total Permitted Pollution Discharge Capacity under a Uniform Price

摘要：

Divisible goods auction is examined as a competition allocation method for total permitted pollution discharge capacity(TPPDC), in which the marginal cost of pollutant treatment is regarded as a polluters private information. An important and interesting equilibrium result is deduced for the auction under a uniform price with a general and continuous marginal cost function,which help to improve the creditability and validity of the pollutant gross control and the environmental plan.

关键词： Divisible Goods Auction Uniform Price Total Permitted Pollution Discharge Capacity

作者: Zhao Yong Chen Yang Wang Qing

作者单位: Systems Engineering Institute, Huazhong University of Science and Technology,1047 Luoyu Road, Wuhan, Hubei, 430074, P R China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第六届管理学国际会议(Proceedings of ICM2007 the 6th International on Management)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 454-458

在线出版日期: 2007-08-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）