Executive Compensation, Speculative Bubbles and Earnings Manipulation

摘要：

Executive incentives have attracted a large of interest in recent years around the world. Especially, the recent stock options incentive mechanism adopted in Chinese stated-own listed firms has generated a lot of controversy. This paper started off with describing the current topic research on Executive stock options incentives, and constructed a model to study earnings manipulation behaviours of managers when the speculative bubbles exist. We conclude theoretically that current speculative bubbles in Chinese stock market is not very benefit to the implementation of stock options incentives plan, which may encourage managersshort-termist behaviours at the expense of long-run firm fundamental value. The paper suggest several hypothesis to indicate the relationship among executive compensation, speculative bubbles and earnings manipulation.

关键词： Stock options Incentives Speculative bubbles Earning manipulation

作者: Li Shuangyan Wan Difang Shi Yarong

作者单位: School of Management, Xian Jiaotong University, P.R.China, 710049

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第六届管理学国际会议(Proceedings of ICM2007 the 6th International on Management)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 784-788

在线出版日期: 2007-08-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）