Study on Financing Constraints and Inefficient Investment of Ultimate Owner in Private Pyramid Firms

摘要：

Based on the theoretic analysis of inefficient investment of ultimate owner, the paper analyzes the problem of inefficient investment of ultimate owner in private firms using unbalanced panel data of Chinese private listed firms. The result suggests that ultimate owner will make under-investment facing financing constraints, and he will do over-investment without financing constraints. The smaller of the cash-flow rights owned by ultimate owner or the worse protection of investors, the more severely over-investment will be undertaken by ultimate owner. Besides, the paper investigates the relationship between the tunneling and over-investment of ultimate owner and finds the positive correlation without financial constraints.

关键词： Pyramid structure Ultimate owner Financing constraints Under-investment Over-investment

作者: Han Zhili Yang Shu-e

作者单位: School of Management, Xian Jiaotong University, Xian.China, 710061 Shanghai Institute of foreign trade, Shanghai, China, 201620

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第六届管理学国际会议(Proceedings of ICM2007 the 6th International on Management)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 811-816

在线出版日期: 2007-08-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）