Control Rights Allocation and Shareholder Wealth Effect in M&A
In the comparatively stable context of day-to-day operation, based on the balanced allocation of control rights which realized in the long-term game, parties of the firm can anticipate their final gains in the incomplete contracts among them. M&A disturbs the existing control rights allocation, meanwhile the post-merger allocation is hard to predicted, so only with mortgaged physical assets, the shareholders cant support other stakeholders confidence about contractual claims. This state may bring about the prevalence of managerial entrenchment and short-term opportunistic behavior, and lead to value destruction at last. With the analysis above, we conclude that, the key value creation factors in M&A are the good corporate government status and sufficiently unused managerial services of the acquiring firm, capital strength alone cant guarantee the acquiring firms shareholders to gain from M&A.
M&A Imperfeet contract Control rights allocation Shareholder wealth effect
Li Shanmin Zheng Nanlei
School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
国际会议
第六届管理学国际会议(Proceedings of ICM2007 the 6th International on Management)
武汉
英文
831-837
2007-08-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）