Control Shareholding and Effect of Top-Management Stock Incentive: Empirical Evidences from Chinese Listed Companies

摘要：

I examine how firm performance is affected by top-manger stock incentive based on the class of control shareholding using data more than 3975 samples during 1999-2005. I find that the link between incentives to top executives and firm performance is related to the class of control shareholding. I find a strong negative relationship between all top-manager incentive ownership and performance in central government control firms, and a slightly positive relationship between firm performance and the corresponding manager board in local government control level, but a negative relationship in central government level. It extends prior literatures by conducting tests on the association between firm performance and stock incentive subject based on class of control shareholding.

关键词： Control shareholding Stock incentive Subject Firm performance Tobins Q

作者: Cheng Zhongming Wu Long Zou Bin

作者单位: School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, P.R.China, 430074

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第六届管理学国际会议(Proceedings of ICM2007 the 6th International on Management)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 850-856

在线出版日期: 2007-08-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）