Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Manager of IT Corporate

摘要：

Based on the characteristics of IT corporate, the principal-agent model between the owner and manager of IT corporate is established by use of information economics theory, the gross benefit of the owner or manager is compared in two situations of symmetric information and asymmetric information, and the relations are studied among risk aversion, stock incentive, effort level of the manager, contract time and gross benefit of the owner etc.. The study shows that choosing low risk-aversion manager and stressing the stock incentive to the manager will do help to the improvement of the owner benefit of IT corporate, the longer the contract time is and the greater the stock incentive to manager will be.

关键词： IT corporate Manager Owner Incentive mechanism

作者: Tao Changqi Xu Ye

作者单位: School of Information Management, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, P.R.China, 330013

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第六届管理学国际会议(Proceedings of ICM2007 the 6th International on Management)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1083-1087

在线出版日期: 2007-08-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）