Manipulation Effect of Managerial Discretion on CEO Pay Level: Evidence from Listed Firms of China

摘要：

Following the managerial discretion approach, the paper empirically analyzes the manipulation effect of managerial discretion on CEO pay level of Chinas Listed Firms. Descriptive statistics and multivariate linear regression model are used here.Both theoretical analysis and empirical tests show that: (1) Managerial discretion has positive effect on CEO pay level; (2) Compared with weak-monitored firms, managerial discretion has Weaker positive effect on CEO pay level for CEOs in strong-monitored firms;(3) Compared with firms with lower performance, there is stronger relationship with Firm performance and managerial pap level for CEOs in firms with higher performance. Based on the three results, the paper makes conclusion that CEOs in Chinas Listed firms really can influence the setting of CEO pay level by misusing managerial discretion, and the manipulation effect actually exists.

关键词： Managerial discretion CEO pay level Manipulation effect Listed firms

作者: Zhang Changzheng Li Huaizu

作者单位: School of Economics and Management, Xian Shiyou University, Xian, P.R.China, 710065 School of Management, Xian Jiaotong University, Xian, P.R.China, 710049

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第六届管理学国际会议(Proceedings of ICM2007 the 6th International on Management)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1093-1102

在线出版日期: 2007-08-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）