A Game Analysis on Innovation Impetus of Firms in Cluster
Innovation is a prerequisite for sustainable competitiveness of clusters. This paper explores the R&D strategy choices of firms which are competing in a cluster in order to understand the factors that affect firms incentive to innovate. We model a static game of innovation and imitation between firms in a cluster. Based on the different periods of the product cycle, we calculate the profits under the different R&D strategy choices, and work out the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium about the firms innovation probabilities. Our analysis of the model reveals that the probabilities are related to market competitive intensity and the structure of clusters.
Innovation impetus Game Cluster
Yang Jian Liang Liang
School of Management, University of science and technology of China P.R.China, 230026
国际会议
第六届管理学国际会议(Proceedings of ICM2007 the 6th International on Management)
武汉
英文
1514-1521
2007-08-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）